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Tracking the impact of depression 
in a perspective-taking task
Heather J. Ferguson1 & James Cane2
Research has identiied impairments in Theory of Mind (ToM) abilities in depressed patients, particularly 
in relation to tasks involving empathetic responses and belief reasoning. We aimed to build on this 
research by exploring the relationship between depressed mood and cognitive ToM, speciically visual 
perspective-taking ability. High and low depressed participants were eye-tracked as they completed a 
perspective-taking task, in which they followed the instructions of a ‘director’ to move target objects 
(e.g. a “teapot with spots on”) around a grid, in the presence of a temporarily-ambiguous competitor 
object (e.g. a “teapot with stars on”). Importantly, some of the objects in the grid were occluded 
from the director’s (but not the participant’s) view. Results revealed no group-based diference in 
participants’ ability to use perspective cues to identify the target object. All participants were faster to 
select the target object when the competitor was only available to the participant, compared to when 
the competitor was mutually available to the participant and director. Eye-tracking measures supported 
this pattern, revealing that perspective directed participants’ visual search immediately upon hearing 
the ambiguous object’s name (e.g. “teapot”). We discuss how these results it with previous studies that 
have shown a negative relationship between depression and ToM.
Research has established that people with clinical depression experience signiicant impairments in everyday 
social function, which typically persist even ater the core symptoms of depression have been relieved1,2. hese 
social impairments may in part be due to the relationship between depression and problems interpreting others’ 
mental states and understanding other people’s actions3,4. Socially-relevant abilities such as these come under the 
umbrella of ‘heory of Mind’ (ToM), a term that is commonly used to refer to the overarching ability to under-
stand that others have mental states (i.e. thoughts, beliefs, intentions and desires) that may difer from our own. 
his ability is important for efective social interactions as it allows us to predict other people’s potential actions, 
and to make relevant and appropriate social responses. Despite numerous studies examining social cognition in 
depressive disorders, the relationship between the two remains poorly understood. his is partly because most 
previous studies have focused on afective ToM (i.e. understanding the emotional states of others, typically via 
facial expressions); depressed individuals are impaired at interpreting others’ afective states and show increased 
sensitivity to sad emotions (for reviews see5,6). In contrast, investigations of the cognitive-social mechanisms that 
might be afected in depression are much more limited, and none so far have employed sophisticated experimen-
tal methods to track ToM use in real-time. herefore, in this paper we use eye-tracking to examine the degree 
to which individuals with high and low numbers of depressive symptoms are able to infer other peoples’ visual 
perspectives online, and use this to guide understanding of verbal instructions in a communication task.
he limited research on depression and function on the cognitive-social domain so far suggests that depressed 
individuals exhibit impaired ToM performance that is similar, though less severe, to that seen in autistic and 
psychotic individuals. Speciically, both empathic responses and reasoning about other people’s beliefs are atten-
uated in those with depression compared to non-depressed controls (e.g7,8), with further evidence demonstrating 
impairments in identifying social faux pas in depressed groups9,10. Depression has also been shown to have a 
particular impact on decoding and reasoning abilities in social situations where contextual information has to be 
integrated4. Interestingly, deicits in ToM abilities have been shown to predict relapse to Major Depression epi-
sodes11. herefore, there is growing evidence for a link between depression and impaired cognitive ToM abilities, 
with the possibility that these deicits may contribute to impairments in social function. However, our under-
standing of this link is limited since all previous research in this domain has employed ‘oline’ response-based 
measures of ToM performance. hat is, previous research has exclusively used tasks that require participants to 
answer explicit questions about another person’s mental state (e.g. “why did X do that?”, “how is Y feeling?”), 
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meaning that while peoples’ accuracy at judging others’ mental states is established, nothing is known about the 
cognitive mechanisms and biases that underlie a particular response. Here, we apply methods from Experimental 
Psychology to record response times and eye movements in a task that requires participants to take the visual 
perspective of another person, thus revealing the implicit mentalizing strategies that people deploy in real-time.
Visual perspective-taking ability is couched within ToM and refers to the ability to assimilate what another 
person can see from their perspective (Level 1 perspective taking), or how another person can see something 
(Level 2 perspective taking, see12). his ability is particularly useful in social interactions as it allows people to 
reduce ambiguities, narrowing down the set of objects being referred to, thereby aiding reasoning about another’s 
intentions and enabling appropriate social responses according to a personal or mutual goal(s) within a particular 
environment. Among healthy adults, a growing body of research has been conducted to examine the cognitive 
processes that underlie ToM and perspective-taking ability, with many studies taking advantage of the precision 
aforded by online measures such as reaction times, eye movements and even electrophysiological responses 
(e.g13–16). A key paradigm that has been developed to examine visual perspective-taking ability is the referential 
communication task17. In this task participants follow the instructions of a ‘director’ to select (“click on the…”) 
or move (“Move/pick up the…”) target objects (e.g. a ball) around a visual display. he visual display typically 
consists of a gridded cupboard; some of the objects in the grid are visible to both the director and the participant, 
but others are occluded from the director’s (but not the participant’s) view. On critical trials, the grid contains a 
range of objects including a target object (e.g. a toy mouse) and a referentially ambiguous competitor object (e.g. 
a computer mouse). To examine perspective-taking ability, the competitor object is placed in privileged ground, 
where it is occluded from the director’s view by a physical barrier. herefore, to correctly identify the target object 
from an ambiguous instruction to “move the mouse let”, participants must infer the director’s limited perspective 
and restrict attention to the mouse in ‘common ground’ (i.e. shared view18) while inhibiting access to the compet-
itor in ‘privileged ground’.
his research has demonstrated that the ability to compute another’s visual perspective occurs rapidly (e.g19–23), 
however incorporating this information into a relevant response can be cognitively demanding and is susceptible 
to errors. Indeed, contrary to the intuition that healthy adults are fully capable ‘mindreaders’, many research-
ers have reported a delay in selecting (or ixating if using eye movement measures) the perspective-appropriate 
object when the director and participant hold conlicting knowledge about the available objects, and even explicit 
errors of selecting a perspective-inappropriate referent (e.g16,24–27). his diiculty has been explained in terms of 
an egocentric or ‘reality’ bias28, as people sufer persistent interference from their own knowledge, perhaps even 
anchoring initial understanding to their own point of view before considering someone else’s27.
Using this paradigm in combination with sensitive reaction time and eye movement measures, visual 
perspective-taking ability has been shown to be inluenced by numerous factors including social and cultural 
relationships29,30, executive functions31–33, and even afective mood34. Speciically, in their study on the efect 
of mood in perspective-taking, Converse et al. (2008) used music and ilms to induce temporary happy or sad 
moods in their participants prior to completing a false belief task (Experiment 1) or the referential communica-
tion perspective-taking task described above (Experiment 2). Both studies showed that when participants were 
primed to feel a positive mood they were more prone to egocentric intrusions, showing a decreased propensity 
to take the other person’s perspective. In contrast, those primed to feel a negative mood were more likely to use 
the other person’s knowledge to complete the tasks. he authors argue that those in a happy mood rely more on 
default stereotypes or egocentric knowledge of other peoples’ mental states compared to those in a sad or neutral 
mood – an idea previously borne out in social judgment studies35. However, this pattern is surprising given the 
previously reviewed evidence for impaired ToM performance in depressed individuals who experience persistent 
feelings of sadness36. hus, we propose that while a sad mood is a component of most episodes of depression it 
is likely that an experimentally induced ‘state’ mood is not equable with the prolonged ‘trait’ mood changes that 
people with depression experience.
In the present study we aimed to build on previous indings by examining how depression impacts the deploy-
ment of perspective-taking in real-time. To this end, we employed an eye-tracked version of the referential 
communication perspective-taking task, and compared performance in two perspective conditions: a ‘Listener 
Privileged’ condition where the competitor object was only available to the participant, and a control ‘Shared 
Perspective’ condition where the target and competitor objects were available to both the participant and director 
condition. Participants were taken from a non-clinical sample, who self-reported high or low numbers of depres-
sive symptoms (measured by the Beck Depression Inventory37).
In line with previous research on clinical depression, we predicted that people in the low depression group 
would successfully use the director’s perspective, so that they experienced less interference from the competi-
tor object when it was in privileged view compared to when it was in shared view. his efect should be mani-
fest in faster response times, and stronger biases to ixate the target object in the Listener Privileged condition 
compared to the Shared Perspective condition, as participants are less likely to consider the privileged object 
as a potential referent. In contrast, we predicted that those in the high depression group would show deicits in 
perspective-taking ability, meaning that they would be delayed in dissociating the target and competitor objects 
on both the Shared Perspective and Listener Privileged conditions due to diiculty inhibiting the competitor 
object in privileged ground.
Method
Participants. In order to identify participants with high and low numbers of depressive symptoms, we irst 
invited 250 non-psychology students from the University of Kent to complete an online self-report ‘mood ques-
tionnaire’- the Beck Depression Inventory (BDI37). his questionnaire consists of 21 groups of statements relating 
to feelings of sadness, pessimism, loss of energy, etc. Participants are instructed to pick out one statement in each 
group that best describes the way they have been feeling in the past two weeks, including today (e.g. ‘I do not feel 
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sad’, ‘I feel sad much of the time’, ‘I am sad all the time’, or ‘I am so sad or unhappy that I can’t stand it’). Scores 
can range from 0 to 63, with higher scores indicating more severe depressive symptoms. Using a cutof of 10 and 
below to indicate minimal depressive symptoms and 17 and over to indicate moderate or severe depression, we 
then invited suitable participants to the lab to complete the perspective-taking task.
In total, sixty-two participants (Mage = 19.1; 55 females) took part in the main experiment. hey were all 
native English speakers, had normal or corrected-to-normal vision, and were either paid for participating or 
received course credits. hirty-three participants were classiied as ‘low depression’ based on their BDI scores 
(range = 0–10; Mean = 4.7, SD = 3.0) and twenty-nine were classified as ‘high depression’ (range = 17–49; 
Mean = 25.7, SD = 9.4). he diference in BDI scores between groups was signiicant, t(60) = 12.19, p < 0.001.
Measures and Design. Each trial in the perspective-taking task consisted of an image of a room containing 
a 4 × 4 gridded cupboard with a male avatar standing to the rear right-hand side of the cupboard (see Fig. 1). For 
both the Listener Privileged and Shared Perspective conditions the backs of ive of the spaces within the cupboard 
were covered so that the contents of these spaces were occluded from the avatar’s view. In total, 26 cupboard con-
igurations were created, two for the practice trials and 24 for the experimental trials (12 Listener Privileged, 12 
Shared Perspective). Twelve sets of 7–8 objects were placed into the cupboard spaces. For the Shared Perspective 
condition each set included a target object (e.g. a glass with an umbrella in) and a competitor object (e.g. a 
glass with a lemon in), which were both in visual common ground. For the Listener Privileged condition the 
competitor object was placed in one of the speaker occluded spaces, thus was only visible to the participant. 
Participants received three instructions per trial, comprising two iller instructions and one critical instruction. 
Critical instructions consisted of “Move the…” + the target object noun (e.g. ball, shoe, truck) + disambiguating 
information (e.g. “with the umbrella in”) + a direction (up, down, let, or right). Filler instructions comprised two 
types, one containing a non-comparative adjective (e.g. “Move the yellow bucket up”) and one not containing an 
adjective (e.g. “Move the bottle down”). he order of iller and critical instructions was counterbalanced across 
trials and a new instruction was only given once participants had responded to the previous instruction. he 
mean onset of the target object noun was 931 msec ater the start of the instruction, the mean disambiguating 
word onset was 1841msec ater the start of the instruction, and the mean ofset was 2265 msec ater the start of 
the instruction.
Eye movements were recorded using an EyeLink 1000 desktop mounted SR Research eye-tracker, with 
eye-movements sampled at a frequency of 1000 Hz. he participant’s head was kept immobile with the use of 
Figure 1. Example stimuli from the referential communication task, to be paired with the instruction, “Move 
the glass with the umbrella in down”. Panel (a) shows an example scene in the Shared Perspective condition 
(i.e. both the target and competitor objects are visible to both speaker and participant), and panel (b) shows 
an example scene in the Listener Privileged condition (i.e. only the target object is visible to both speaker and 
participant).
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a chin and forehead rest throughout the experiment and only the right eye was tracked. Stimuli were presented 
on a 19-inch TFT monitor screen with a screen resolution of 1,024~768 pixels 60 cm from the participant. A 
nine-point calibration sequence was used to calibrate participants’ eye movements and a drit correction check 
(central ixation point on the screen) was displayed at the start of each trial. he perspective-taking task was deliv-
ered and controlled using the Eye-Link Experiment Builder Sotware (version 1.10.165). Each box on the 4 × 4 
grid covered an average visual angle of 4.25° on the horizontal plane and an average visual angle of 5.35° on the 
vertical plane, dependent on the location of the box. he description on where to move the objects for each trial 
were delivered in mono sound to participants through headphones covering both ears.
Procedure. he study was conducted in accordance with British Psychology Society guidelines, and received 
ethical approval from the University of Kent. Participants sat in front of the monitor and were given instructions 
on how to complete the referential communication task, using the mouse to move objects one space let, right, 
up, or down, according to the instructions given by the avatar. Participants were instructed to take the avatars 
perspective into account throughout; they were shown a single example of the grid from their perspective and 
from the avatars perspective to ensure they understood that their perspectives difered. Once the participants had 
indicated they fully understood the instructions, their eye-movements were calibrated and the headphones for the 
instructions were placed over their ears. Participants then received two practice trials, one replicating a trial from 
each of the conditions, before moving onto the main set of 24 experimental trials that were randomly presented 
for each participant. In each trial, participants saw a grid scene for the perspective-taking task, and responded to 
three instructions to move objects around this grid. he visual locations of objects in the grid were updated in real 
time as participants moved them. Halfway through the experiment participants were able to take a short break. 
Once they were ready to continue, eye movements were recalibrated to ensure accuracy and the remaining trials 
were delivered. Participants gave informed consent prior to participating and were fully debriefed at the end of 
the experiment.
Eye movement analyses. Regions of interest (ROIs) were speciied around all of the objects within the 
4 × 4 cupboard, and the remaining areas were coded as background. Analyses examined looks to the target object 
(and competitor object) locations in each condition and group. Two ixation measures were calculated. First, 
we calculated the probability that participants made at least one ixation on the target/competitor object during 
the ambiguous period, between the onset of the target object’s name (e.g. from the ‘g’ in “glass” for “move the 
glass with the…”) and the onset of the disambiguating detail (the ‘u’ in “umbrella in”). his analysis period was 
deined on a trial-by-trial basis according to the absolute onset times for individual words in each item, and lasted 
for an average of 910 msec (SD: 131; range: 692–1169). here was no diference in the length of this ambiguous 
period between Listener Privileged (M = 899 msec) and Shared Perspective (M = 922 msec) conditions, t < 1. 
Analysing eye movements prior to the onset of disambiguating information allows us to examine participants’ 
anticipatory eye movements towards objects in the scene- i.e. looks to objects that they expect to be mentioned 
in the unfolding instruction. he probability of ixating the target object was deined as the sum of ixations to 
the target object divided by the total number of ixations elsewhere (i.e. all ROIs, including background) on that 
trial, and the probability of ixating the competitor object was deined as the sum of all ixations to the competitor 
object divided by the total number of ixations elsewhere on that trial. he second ixation measure examined the 
latency of irst ixations on the target object (i.e. time to irst ixate the target object), relative to the onset of the 
ambiguous noun (e.g. from the ‘g’ in “glass” for “move the glass with the…”). his analysis period was deined on 
a trial-by-trial basis according to the absolute onset times for individual words in each item, and included any irst 
ixations on the target until participants made a selection response.
Results
Accuracy. Mean accuracy was high (98.6%) across all participants, thus no further analyses were con-
ducted on error rates for the director task. hese near ceiling responses show that all participants were suc-
cessfully able to complete the task (since ambiguity was always resolved at sentence end, e.g. “umbrella in”), 
and support our focus on the implicit measures that underlie processing prior to object selection. All trials 
with selection errors were removed from subsequent analyses. All data is publically available at https://osf.
io/2vdzc/?view_only = 501bc4a276804957899acf3aa4f17b8.
Response times. Outlier data points were detected and removed from the target selection response times 
using a cutof of 2.5 standard deviations from the mean of each group, which removed 1.78% of the data. he 
resulting reaction times were entered into a 2 (Group: Low vs. high depression) × 2 (Condition: Shared Perspective 
vs. Listener Privileged) mixed model ANOVA with Group as the between subjects factor and Condition as the 
within subject factor. he data are plotted in Fig. 2, showing raw data points, a horizontal line relecting the 
group/condition mean, a bean showing smoothed density, and a rectangle representing the Bayesian highest 
density interval. Statistical analysis revealed a signiicant main efect of Condition, F(1,60) = 18.59, p < 0.001, 
pη² = 0.24, with signiicantly longer reactions times in the Shared Perspective condition (M = 2708 ms) compared 
to the Listener Privileged condition (M = 2610 ms). here was no signiicant main efect of Group (F(1,60) = 0.28, 
p = 0.6) or a signiicant interaction between Condition and Group (F(1,60) = 1.59, p = 0.21).
In addition, a bivariate correlation analysis between participants’ BDI scores and their perspective-taking 
score (calculated as the RT diference between responses in the Listener Privileged and Shared Perspective condi-
tions) showed no signiicant correlation (r(62) = 0.09, p = 0.49).
Probability of ixating. he mean probabilities of making an anticipatory ixation on the target object and 
competitor object for each condition and depression group are plotted in Fig. 3. Data was analysed using a 2 
(Group: High vs. Low depression) × 2 (Condition: Shared Perspective vs. Listener Privileged) × 2 (Object: Target 
www.nature.com/scientificreports/
5SCIENTIFIC REPORTS | 7: 14821  | DOI:ͷͶ.ͷͶ͹8/sͺͷͻ98-Ͷͷ7-ͷ͹9͸͸-y
vs. Competitor) mixed-model ANOVA. Analyses revealed a signiicantly higher probability of ixating the tar-
get object compared to the competitor object (0.35 vs. 0.29; F(1,60) = 16.86, p < 0.001, pη² = 0.22), however this 
efect was qualiied by a signiicant interaction between Object and Condition, F(1,60) = 6.51, p = 0.01, pη² = 0.1. 
Follow-up analyses showed that participants were equally likely to ixate the competitor object in the Shared 
Perspective and Listener Privileged conditions, t < 1, but were signiicantly more likely to make anticipatory ix-
ations on the target object in the Listener Privileged condition compared to the Shared Perspective condition, 
t(61) = 3.78, p < 0.001. In addition, participants were signiicantly more likely to ixate the target object than the 
competitor object in the Listener Privileged condition, t(61) = 4.5, p < 0.001, but showed no object preference in 
the Shared Perspective condition, t = 1.4. Despite a numerically larger efect of condition on ixations to target 
in the low depression group than the high depression group, none of the interactions involving group reached 
signiicance, all Fs < 1.
A bivariate correlation analysis between participants’ BDI scores and their perspective-taking score (calculated 
as the diference in the probability of ixating the target between the Listener Privileged and Shared Perspective 
conditions) showed no signiicant correlation (r(62) = −0.14, p = 0.2).
Latency of irst ixation to target. he mean latency to irst ixate the target object for each condition 
and depression group are plotted in Fig. 4. Data was analysed using a 2 (Group: High vs. Low depression) × 2 
(Condition: Shared Perspective vs. Listener Privileged) mixed-model ANOVA. Analyses showed that overall, 
Figure 2. Target selection response times on the perspective-taking task, for each condition and depression 
group.
Figure 3. Probability of ixating the competitor object and the target object for each condition and depression 
group.
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participants were signiicantly faster to irst ixate the target object in the Listener Privileged condition compared 
to the Shared Perspective condition (711ms vs. 809ms; F(1,60) = 9.61, p < 0.005, pη² = 0.14). Despite a numeri-
cally larger efect of condition in the low depression group than the high depression group, neither the main efect 
of Group (F < 0.1) or the interaction between Group and Condition (F < 1.46, p > 0.23) was signiicant.
A bivariate correlation analysis between participants’ BDI scores and their perspective-taking score (calcu-
lated as the latency diference between irst ixations to target in the Listener Privileged and Shared Perspective 
conditions) showed no signiicant correlation (r(62) = −0.19, p = 0.15).
General Discussion
he present study sought to identify the impact of depression on ToM ability, speciically in the social-cognitive 
domain of perspective-taking. Eye movements and behavioural responses were recorded whilst participants com-
pleted a communication task where they had to use perspective cues to resolve a referential ambiguity (e.g. identi-
fying the correct ‘glass’ to move when more than one glass was visually present). he efects of perspective-taking 
were compared between participants who self-reported a high and low number of depressive symptoms in two 
perspective conditions: a ‘Listener Privileged’ condition, where a competitor object was only available to the 
participant, and a ‘Shared Perspective’ condition, where the competitor object was mutually available to the par-
ticipant and avatar.
In both the high and low depression groups, participants successfully used perspective cues to disambiguate 
the target object from the competitor object. his efect was evidenced by faster reaction times to select the target 
object in the Listener Privileged condition compared to the Shared Perspective condition. hus, at the point of 
selection, participants were able to override their own egocentric biases to accommodate another person’s per-
spective. Further evidence was shown in the real-time eye-tracking data, which revealed that immediately upon 
hearing the ambiguous object’s name (e.g. “glass”), participants in both groups showed a stronger bias to ixate 
the target object when the competitor object was in privileged versus shared view, and looked faster towards the 
target object when perspective allowed them to inhibit the competitor object (i.e. when this competitor was hid-
den from the director). Nevertheless, this eye-tracking data also showed that participants were equally likely to 
ixate the competitor object when it was mutually available (i.e. in the Shared Perspective) and when it was hidden 
from the speaker’s perspective (Listener Privileged), suggesting that although participants preferred to ixate the 
mutually available target in the Listener Privileged condition, they also experienced interference from the hidden 
competitor object in their own egocentric view. hese results are therefore consistent with the patterns found in 
previous studies that have examined the cognitive processes that underlie ToM and perspective-taking ability 
in healthy adults (e.g.17,19,20,23,32). Importantly, the fact that group did not modulate these efects suggests that 
depression had little impact on the speed with which individuals were able to use perspective cues to interpret 
ambiguous communication, and that participants with high and low numbers of depressive symptoms experi-
enced comparable levels of egocentric intrusions.
he inding of preserved cognitive ToM in depressed individuals is interesting because it contrasts with pre-
vious research that has shown deicits in ToM ability in depression. Speciically, a relatively robust relationship 
has been found between depressive symptoms and afective ToM (see5,6 for reviews), though the relationship 
with cognitive ToM is less stable, with some studies reporting impairments (e.g.7–10), and others showing little 
diference between depressed and non-depressed groups (e.g.4,7,38). As such, it is possible that the negative impact 
of depression on ToM is limited to afective and social aspects of cognition, meaning that higher-level cognitive 
processes are intact (see39). he current task required participants to adopt the director’s visual perspective to cor-
rectly interpret their instructions, thus the demands on mental state decoding (inferring their thoughts, beliefs, 
desires, intentions etc) were relatively low. In addition, it is possible that the use of an on-screen, rather than live 
director, may have reduced participants’ social engagement with the task, and thus masked some of the ToM dif-
iculties that people with depression experience in everyday life. Using an avatar and pre-recorded speech in the 
current task eliminated variations in verbal and non-verbal behaviours that are common in live conversation, and 
Figure 4. Mean latency to irst ixate the target object for each condition and depression group.
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was based on previous studies (e.g.32,40,41). However, future studies should aim to increase the ecological validity 
of this task to examine whether people with depression exhibit impaired perspective-taking performance on this 
task when interacting with a real person.
he results are therefore more in line with Converse et al.’s34 study that employed a similar communication 
task to ours, and showed comparable ToM use when participants were primed to feel sad and neutral moods 
(though impaired ToM when they were primed to feel happy). It is also consistent with research that has shown 
intact cognitive processing in a sad mood42, despite signiicant executive dysfunctions in major depression (for 
reviews, see43,44), since these general executive skills are known to play a vital role in successful ToM31–33. hus, we 
infer that our high depression sample had preserved executive skills (i.e. inhibitory control and working mem-
ory), which allowed them to resist excessive interference from the perspective inappropriate competitor object. 
Correspondingly, it is important to consider whether the lack of impairments seen in the current study relate to 
the severity of depressive symptoms among our depressed participants, and whether the increased BDI scores are 
more relective of a low mood than cognition-altering clinical depression. A recent meta-analysis of ToM in major 
depression has revealed that the magnitude of ToM impairments in depressive disorders is signiicantly related 
to the severity of depressive symptoms (ref.45 see also46). he participants tested here were from a non-clinical 
sample, meaning that they were not recruited on the basis of a formal diagnosis of major depression. Instead, we 
assessed depressive symptoms using the BDI, and classiied participants into statistically diferent high and low 
groups. hough none of the interactions with group reached signiicance in the current study, the eye-tracking 
data leave open the possibility that people with high levels of depression might experience more interference 
from their own egocentric perspective than people without depression; high depression participants showed a 
numerically smaller and slower bias to ixate the target object in the Listener Privileged condition. Indeed, while 
our correlation analyses between participants’ BDI scores and their perspective-taking ability were not signiicant, 
the eye-tracking data showed a trend for this pattern, with target bias decreasing and latency to ixate the target 
increasing as depression severity increased. As such, while the null efects of group found in the current study 
suggest that perspective-taking ability is not inluenced by sub-clinical levels of depression, future research should 
investigate whether signiicant diiculties would emerge on this socio-cognitive dimension when the severity of 
depression is increased.
More broadly, the present study links to previous indings showing that cognitive distortions linked to depres-
sion may impact cognitive tasks by modulating negative expectations of performance, rather than depression 
directly impacting the underlying cognitive processes. Cognitive distortions and ‘learned helplessness’ are prev-
alent in depression and can lead to both negative expectations of the future, and negative appraisals of previous 
performance47–49, however the impact of these negative ruminations on cognitive tasks remains under debate. 
Some studies on patients with a mild head injury have shown no efect of negative expectations on performance50, 
and others have shown impairments in a range of cognitive tasks when patients were explicitly reminded that 
their diagnosis might lead to poorer cognitive performance51,52, independent of any co-morbid depression 
diagnosis. hus, whilst the impact of negative expectations on cognitive tasks remains inconclusive, this line of 
research suggests that depression itself may not impair ToM performance, but that diiculties may emerge when 
task goals are more explicit (e.g. judging others’ emotions using the Mind in the Eyes task, as in previous research) 
and participants hold existing negative expectations of their performance. In contrast, when a task manipulates 
more subtle variables between conditions and measures implicit performance using continuous measures (e.g. 
the shared vs. listener conditions and response latencies/eye movement measures used here), participants will be 
less aware of what is being tested and have no prior expectations about performance meaning that performance 
is unafected. Further research is needed to identify whether and how the negative expectations and distorted 
cognitions that are hallmark of depression inluence performance on diferent ToM tasks.
Finally, we note that a complex relationship between emotion and perspective-taking has begun to emerge 
in recent research, with happy and angry emotions increasing egocentric biases, guilt and sadness enhancing 
inferences about others’ perspectives, and shame impairing participants’ ability to handle conlicting perspec-
tives without inluencing attention allocation34,53–55. In addition, a recent study has shown individual diferences 
in perspective-taking ability (including relative biases from self and other perspectives) that are modulated by 
emotional states, including sadness and happiness56. Research has identiied that depression can be diferentiated 
as a personality trait and also as an emotional state, and it is the latter which is most associated with non-clinical 
samples (see57–59). However, the BDI is more likely to be a measure of trait depression, particularly in female 
respondents58, meaning that it’s unclear to what extent the depression measured in this study represents a trait 
or state level of depression. Since depression involves a mixture of many diferent ‘state’ emotions (oten speciic 
to an individual and changing day-to-day), which inluence perspective-taking in diferent ways, future research 
should aim to understand how these complex combinations of state and trait emotions interact to inluence ToM 
use over time.
In conclusion, the current study demonstrates that people with high and low levels of depression show a 
comparable ability to rapidly integrate another person’s visual perspective, and use this in real-time to inter-
pret their verbal descriptions. his suggests that depression does not inluence the high-level cognitive ability to 
inhibit one’s own egocentric point of view and infer another person’s view. hese indings support a model of the 
ToM-depression relationship whereby deicits are speciic to afective and social domains, leaving some cognitive 
aspects of ToM intact.
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